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In Chapter 1, we hypothesized that a possible role of education
is as a credential, license, or screen. By this we mean that entry
into some high-paying occupations is not free to all, but gener-
ally requires that a person of a given skill level also possess a
minimum level of educational attainment. In this chapter we
consider reasons why firms might use education as a screening
device, and we develop and implement a test for the existence
of screening. If screening based on education occurs, then a per-
son with more education earns more income partly because he
is allowed to hold a high-paying job. Concomitantly, some peo-
ple with low educational attainment who also want and could
manage the high-paying jobs are excluded from them. Thus,
part of the income differential attributed to education arises
from an income redistribution due to restricted entry and not to
an increase in skills. This implies that the returns to society
from educational programs may be overestimated by conven-
tional measures.1
A general assumption made in most research in the human-
capital area is that each person is paid a (real) wage rate equal to
his marginal product (less any costs for general training). Al-
though this conclusion is valid in a perfectly competitive world,
some deviations from competition, such as the existence of
costs of obtaining information, may invalidate it. A firm may
have knowledge about the marginal productivity of some fac-
tors of production; for example, a manager can determine that
all models of a particular machine will produce 100 units of out-
'However, if education is not available for screening, other sorting devices have
to be used, but should they be less expensive than education, the social rate of
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putper hour. People, however, cannot generally be classified expTh
into types that produce specific numbers of units of Output, relati'
because a person's productivity level depends upon a complex peten
set of inherited and acquired skills. Further, not only are mdi. when
vidual skills difficult to identify and measure, but various skills trial-
also are more useful in some occupations than others. These last how
two points are illustrated by the occupational regressions US whol
ing both the Wolfie-Smith and NBER-TH samples. For example, whic
the coefficients on mental ability and education are greater tively
the managerial and professional occupations than in the white- by ty1
collar or blue-collar occupations. Moreover, as reported job.
Chapter 8, these variables, plus measures of family and per-
sonal characteristics, explain less than 30 percent of the earn- ing a
ings variance in any of our occupations. Thus, either luck or skill I
some other unmeasured variables are very important deter- job. F
minants of earnings in the occupations. and s
Even though an employer might find it impossible to predict
in advance the marginal productivity of any worker in all possi- Bef
ble positions in his firm, the competitive outcome could result nalin
if a trial-and-error procedure were followed. That is, the firm Man)
could pay a piece rate for each position and could allow individ- been,
uals to fill the positions they desired. There are such jobs as crede
fruit picker and some sales positions that are based on a (Mill
piecework system, but most occupations are not. Instead, most find
positions pay a person a fixed amount each hour, day, week, ampi
month, or year, and indeed there may be good economic dicta
reasons for paying these fixed sums per period. If the output is dices
produced by an assembly line or other team of workers or if is im
there is no directly observable physical output, it may be ex- not b
tremely difficult or costly to measure the output of each no w
worker.2 But, in any event, firms agree to hire people for at least
a limited time and pay them these fixed sums regardless of how does
well or how poorly they perform. Firms therefore have some in- for a
centive to try to hire people whose marginal product will be at not g
least equal to the wage payment. Of course, workers also have posit
an incentive to perform, since firms will try to fire those whose More
marginal product can be judged to be less than the wage (after ers
trainingperiods are over). Moreover, because of union rules or
the expenses associated with hiring and firing, there is often an a I
(1972)
appea
2What, for example, is the marginal product of a bureaucrat? peopiEducation as a screening device155
explicitor implicit agreement by the firm to retain a worker for
relatively long periods—subject to his not being grossly incom-
petent or insubordinate and to cyclical conditions. Finally,
when there is a division of labor, it may be very costly to allow a
trial-and-error system in which an individual demonstrates
how good he is, since an error at one point might cripple a
whole production line. Thus, when the labor market is one in
which people are paid a fixed period wage and hired for a rela-
tively long time, firms have an incentive to try to sort people
by types and levels of skills to find the right person for the right
job.
There are many ways in which firms can perform such sort-
ing and matching. One way is to administer tests to measure
skill levels, and another is to observe performance on a simpler
job. Firms can also use such characteristics as neatness, sex, age,
and so forth, as indicators of a person's productivity.3 Another
possible signal is education, upon which this chapter will focus.
Before proceeding with the discussion of education as a sig-
naling or screening device, several comments are in order.
Many people have long maintained that the United States has
been, and is increasingly becoming, a country concerned with
credentials, with education being one of the major credentials
(Miller & Reissman, 1969). While economists are predisposed to
find a rational explanation for business behavior, as for ex-
ample in the preceding discussion, the use of education may be
dictated partially by snobbery, ignorance, or irrational preju-
dices. Distinguishing between rational and irrational behavior
is important, but since our test for the existence of screening is
not based on the assumption of rational firm behavior, we have
no way of knowing whether such behavior prevails.
Second, it should be recognized that our screening model
does not imply that education is a license absolutely required
for a position. If firms, while sorting and matching people, do
not get enough applicants with the preferred education to fill
positions, some people with less education will be accepted.
Moreover, the number of such people accepted as, say, manag-
ers will depend on the business demand for managers and the
3For a lucid discussion of the economics of signaling see Spence (1972). Arrow
(1972) has applied this theory to the education market. Both these papers, which
appeared after we finished this work, go further than we do by arguing that
people decide rationally whether to obtain the signal, that is, to go to college.
and earnings154
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supply of college graduates to this occupation, both of which The
are likely to fluctuate over time. While it is possible in some as on
time period for no one to be accepted whose education is too knOW
low, our test for screening requires some people with less than argur
the normal amount of education to be working in the occupa- pie (1
tions in which education is used as a screening device. colleg
Let us suppose that firms have a number of sorting devices ings
available to match persons and positions. Each sorting method small
entails direct costs such as salaries of personnel interviewers ratioi
and indirect costs such as mistakes made on the job. In a more to hir
formal sense, the firm should consider as the indirect costs the woul(
expected difference between the wage payments and the other
marginal product of all people who will be hired for a position and t
by a given sorting method.4 For any particular job, the firm
should adopt the sorting method that is cheapest to use, but of scree:
course the method may differ for different jobs. Suppose that seqw
successful performance in, say, the managerial occupation when
depends upon the individual's possessing a complex set of tal- avaiL
ents and skills, including intelligence, leadership, and judg- many
ment. Firms might attempt to develop and use tests for these certa:
skills in recruiting people for the particular occupation. But the hand
development of tests and the examination of recruits can be ex- As
pensive and may not be very useful if the appropriate skills are years
not easily measured and mistakes on the job are expensive, to thi
Suppose, however, that firms either know (from past experi- diplo
ence) or believe that educational attainment is correlated with work
the necessary complex of skills.5 This does not mean that all
college graduates and no high school graduates have the neces- 7Analo
sary skills, but that a significantly larger percentage of college it:or
graduatesare so endowed. Thus, to save on hiring costs, firms 'A an
may decide to use information on educational attainment avail- for in'
able at a near-zero cost as a preliminary screening device.6 and
Other criteria may also be used in hiring a person, and reten-
tion and especially promotion may well depend on performance
on the job. collect
ume.)
cessib
11f the firm is risk-averse, it might also consider the variance in the mistakes. tempc
51t is likely that in past decades high school was the screening level for high-pay- sarnpl
ing jobs, as indeed it may be now for some types of lower-paying jobs. a
'See Arrow's recent paper (1972) for a rigorous theoretical treatment of some of least
the problems involved in hypothesizing that education is used as a filtering use u
device, take i.tication and earnings156 Educationas a screening device157
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The case for screening based on education can be thought of
as one of market failure arising from the cost of obtaining
knowledge. Some people with whom we have discussed this
argument believe that the expenses associated with hiring peo-
ple (based on, say, a formula predicting who could finish
college) would be small enough—given the proportion of earn-
ings differentials we attribute below to screening, and the
small return to a college degree—to make it profitable for some
rational firms that rely heavily on the high-paying occupations
to hire many (or only) high school graduates. Since these firms
would have lower costs and higher profits, they would expand,
other firms would stop paying a premium to college graduates,
and the screen would be eroded.
There are several responses to this argument. First, even if the
screening function were to vanish in the long run, its con-
sequences would be observable before then.7 Second, even
when there is a profit to be made by discovering and exploiting
available information, the actual discovery may not occur for
many years.8 Thus, the use of education as a screening device is
certainly not a proposition which should be rejected out of
hand.
As a corroborative bit of evidence, we note that in the last few
years so-called diploma mills have become a matter of concern
to the educational community. For a fee, these schools grant
diplomas by mail without requiring attendance or much, if any,
work. Consequently, it is difficult to see how these schools
7Analogously, in the long run, with perfect competition, there are no excess prof-
its or rates of return on capital. But in the short run, while capital is being ex-
panded, excess profits could exist and be measured.
8As an example, we offer the first part of this study. Two large and rich samples
for investigating the rate of return to higher education net of the effect of ability
and family background are the Wolfie-Smith and NBER-TH samples, both of
which were available in the 1950s. The only prior analysis of the Wolfie-Smith
data consists of the original few cross tabulations for males in the Wolfie-Smith
report in 1956, with some slight extensions in Denison (1964). (Data were also
collected for females but were used for the first time in Chapter 3 of this vol-
ume.) We have learned that the data for people of Minnesota were intact and ac-
cessible until 1966 at the University of Minnesota, but were permanently or
temporarily lost when some operations were moved. The Thorndike-Hagert
sample was sitting unused in a basement at Columbia Teachers College for over
a decade despite the fact that it is mentioned in Hunt (1963) and was known at
least to Lee Hansen. Both samples would have provided data for a series of very
useful and important articles in a highly competitive profession. Why did it
take up to 15 years for these data sources to be resurrected?r
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couldbe adding much to a person's level of skills. Yet the fact tent
that people are willing to pay the fees suggests that the diploma mar
is useful to them, and clearly one possibility is that it is useful tion
in passing an educational screen. It is also worth noting that the pro
uproar over the diploma mills has not come from businesses
thatcheated, but from the more respectable members of the POTENTIALAss
EARNINGS i academiccommunity. In addition, casual evidence—such as ai, e
newspaper advertisements that list a college diploma as a acte
prerequisite—suggests the existence of screening. However,
this is far from conclusive, since many jobs may, in fact, require
specialized knowledge attainable only in college.9
Because these suggestions are not in any way conclusive, it is wh
necessary to construct a more formal test for the existence of ciei
screening. Before doing this, we shall define more precisely the COfl
concept of screening itself. Screening based on educational attain- pot
ment occurs when, because of lack of educational attainment, a per- sub
son is excluded from an occupation in which he would have a higher the
marginal product or higher (discounted) earnings. This definition vid
introduces the idea of different occupations or jobs—a neces- cup
sary concept because if a person's marginal product and wage ing
rate do not differ across occupations, then he cannot be I!
excluded on the basis of his education from all occupations in ten
which his marginal product would be highest. has
The test for screening thus involves comparing the actual and jus
expected fractions of people in different occupations at various occ
education levels. If the actual fraction of people in the high-pay- are
ing occupations is less than the expected fraction at low levels of san
education, but not at high ones, and if the occupations are ones
apriori expect some screening, this suggests ing
that screening is, in fact, present. tril
The initial step in determining the expected distribution is to ml]
estimatethe potential income that any individual could earn in the
various occupations. If we then assume that the individual
chooses the occupation that yields the highest income, we can
estimate the distribution of individuals over occupations that toof
would prevail with free entry. If we assume further that the po-
Thi
soli
°En addition, firms may hire people at low hierarchical positions to sort people fen
for high-level positions. Individuals with low education may be able to master 0CC
the low-level job but not the high-level one; hence, firms would not be willing not
to hire them at all.a screening device159
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tential earnings in an occupation are equal to a person's
marginal product in that occupation, we can estimate the por-
tion of observed educational earnings differences due to skills
produced by education and the portion due to screening.
POTENTIALAssume that there are n occupations and that for each individu-
EARNINGSal,earnings in occupation i (y1) are determined by a set of char-
acteristics (X) as follows:
—Xf31 + u, = 1,n(9-1)
where u1 is a random disturbance andis a vector of coeffi-
cients for occupation i.'° If all the variables (X) that influence in-
come in a systematic way are observable, we can estimate the
potential earnings of any individual in the ith occupation by
substituting his X values in Eq. (9-1). As long as we can ignore
the random-disturbance term, our model predicts that all indi-
viduals with identical X characteristics will choose the same oc-
cupation if occupational choice is based on maximum earn-
ings."
Is it proper to ignore the error term? If the disturbance is in-
terpreted as a chance or luck factor about which the individual
has no knowledge when he is making his decision, then we are
justified in ignoring it when comparing potential income and
occupational choice unless there is differential risk and people
are not neutral toward risk. Also, if the disturbance term is the
same in all occupations for an individual, then even if he is
aware of the disturbance, the rankings of occupations by earn-
ings will not change. In either of these cases, the expected dis-
tribution of individuals over occupations can be readily deter-
mined simply by evaluating Eq. (9-1) for each occupation for
the known X's and selecting the maximum income. In this case,
'°Of course, any individual has only one occupation, but we can estimate a sepa-
rate equation for each occupation based on the people in that occupation. The
problems involved in this method are discussed below.
"This result holds only because we assume that occupational choice depends
solely on income. If the choice also depends on nonpecuniary factors valued dif-
ferently by various individuals, then all individuals need not choose the same
occupation. This problem is ignored in the following discussion, since it does
not present any difficulties as far as our test for screening is concerned. See,
however, the section below on risk aversion.Higher education and earnings160
wher
as just noted, all individuals with a given set of characteristics norm
will be in one occupation.'2 sicall
The problem is more complicated if one does not want to ig- bility
nore the random-disturbance terms or interpret them in this certal
way. If the jth individual is aware of his disturbance terms and come
if they differ by occupation, the incomes that must be compared p ca
are +and not just Since we do not know the UU, vria
we cannot determine which occupation a particular person will matii
choose, but by making various assumptions about the distribu- an
tion of the error terms, we can estimate the probability that a we c
person with a given set of X's will choose a particular occupa- occu
tion. An important question concerning the error terms is w
whetherthey are correlated. for the 1th individual over the expri
various occupations. In some instances, a person will know that
his particular job is paying him more than he could expect if ar
working for another firm in the same or a different occupation. the I
For example, a person would know if he married the boss's grea
daughter, or if he had stumbled into a good job offer. Indeed, dish
the theory of information costs in job search would lead to the To £
occupational distribution described by Eq. When the tegr
errors arise for these types of reasons, we can assume that the —
disturbancesare not correlated over occupations. A much more tion
important explanation for the errors, however, is that there are the
some X's we have not been able to measure or hold constant. If equ
these X's are important income determinants in different oc- but
cupations, then the regression errors will be correlated across cho
such occupations. We discuss below the importance of a non-
zero-covariance of errors across occupations. deci
Assume for the moment that errors are not correlated over oc- will
cupations and that the errors in each occupation are normally -n
distributed.Then the probability that an individual chooses the the
mth occupation is given by'4 tion
Pm=J,frn (z ) fi(z)dz (9-2) 5As
tion
sam
'2Ail people with a given education level need not be in the same occupation. tical
Other variables in X, in addition to education, can affect occupational choice. regi
tion
3For an analysis of the effects of job-search costs on employment choice, see Holt
11
(1970). tioi
'4Eq. (9-2) also holds for nonnormal distributions.Education as a screening device161
where(z) is the cumulative normal density and fm(z)is the
normal density function with mean Ym and variance Ba-
sically, Pm is the sum of all products representing the proba-
bility that potential income in the mth occupation takes on a
certain value, times the probability that all other potential in-
comes, given byfliF, (z), are less than this value. Unfortunately,
Pm cannot be expressed in a simpler form even if the means and
variances of all the incomes are known, However, an approxi-
mation to Pm can be obtained by numerical integration. Since
an equation analogous to Eq. (9-2) holds for every occupation,
we can obtain estimates of the distribution of individuals by
occupation.
When there are only two occupations, the problem can be
expressed in an alternative form that provides some additional
insight. Let the two occupations be 1 and 2, with mean incomes
Y1 and Y2 such that Y1 <Y2.We are interested in determining
the fraction of peoplethe population for whom Y1 will be
greater than Y2. If earnings in both occupations are normally
distributed, then= — Y2will also be distributed normally.
To find the probability that Y3 is nonnegative, we need to in-
tegrate from zero to infinity the normal curve with mean
—Y2and variance cr12 + — In the normal distribu-
tion, half the people are found to the right, and half to the left, of
the mean. Thus, if the mean ofwere zero, that is,if
equaledY2, then half the people would choose each occupation,
but if Y1 were less than Y2, fewer than half the people would
choose 1. For a given variance of Y3. and mean income in oc-
cupation 2, the proportion that will choose occupation 1 will
decrease asfalls.Also, for a given —theproportion that
will choose 1 will decrease as the variance of Y3 decreases.
This formulation also is useful in assessing the importance of
the assumption of a zero correlation of the errors over occupa-
tions. Assuming that the errors in each occupation are indepen-
'5As an estimate of this variance for the mth occupation ((Tm2),weuse the condi-
tional variance based on — Ym. Theassumption that this variance is the
same for people not in m as for those in mwhenestimating what those not in ,ii
wouldearn in m seems reasonable, since individuals are supposed to be iden-
tical on the average after standardizing for all the characteristics used in the
regression analysis. We shall later discuss circumstances in which this assump-
tion is not reasonable.
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dent is the same as assuming that cr12 is zero. If, however, some expect
variable X1, whose coefficient is of the same sign in both oc- cusse
cupations, is omitted, then a-12 will be positive and we shall
overestimate the variance of Y3 and the fraction of people in oc- SCREENING:Wecc
cupation 1, which has the lower mean earnings. Thus, if we cupati
improperly ignore positive values for a-12, we will bias the tests regres
against acceptance of the hypothesis of screening. On the other prece
hand, if a-12 is negative because the coefficient of an omitted Xis depei
positive in one occupation and negative in another, then the Tab
test we use will be biased in favor of accepting screening. Such tribut
a bias might arise if, for example, initiative and independence
were rewarded in the managerial category while their opposites the cc
were rewarded in white-collar or blue-collar jobs. We judge the the d
positive correlation to be more likely. Now let us drop the as- of
sumption of only two occupations. When there are many oc- The r
cupations, the problem becomes intractable computationally if tual f
we assume that the distributions are not independent. That is, are c
suppose that there is a positive correlation between the U'sfor some
an individual across occupations. In this case, the expression noun
for the probability that an individual will choose a given oc- ers,I
cupationcannot be written in a simplified form such as Eq. same
(9-2), but must be expressed as a multiple integral, the evalua- In
tion of which, although possible numerically, would be very come
tedious. However, this is not a serious problem, since the in- inclu
dependence assumption does not seem unreasonable, and as colla
shown above, it biases the results in the direction of rejecting tial f
the screening hypothesis. tion
Before we present the results of our calculations, two points of th
should be considered. First, if some occupation-education cells ancy
are empty, we cannot estimate Y in these cells. For example, in relat
the NBER-TH sample there are no individuals with Ph.D's in self
the blue-collar, white-collar, or service occupations. Thus, the low
calculations given below are based on the assumption that all cup
occupations are open to those at the high school, some-college, W
and B.A. education levels, but that at the graduate levels—
which will not be studied—some occupations are irrelevant. 'The
Second, we are assuming that the individual's occupational (that
choicedepends only on the monetary income he can expect to errol
earn.If occupational choice depends also on such tactors as '1Ther
nonmonetary returns and fringe benefits not included in
moneyincome and if these vary across occupations, then ourcation and earnings162 Education as a screening device163
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expected distributions will be inaccurate. This problem is dis-
cussed in more detail below.
SCREENING:Weconsider first the results for 1969 for the seven broad oc-
cupationalgroups discussed in Chapter 8. The occupational
regressions used for this purpose are those discussed in the
preceding chapter, except that they include as an additional in-
dependent variable the residual from 1955.16
Table9-i contains the expected and actual occupational dis-
tributions for the high school, some-college, and B.A. education
categories, together with the means and standard deviations of
the corresponding earnings levels.'7 The entries in column 4 are
the differences between the expected and the actual percentage
of people in each occupation at each of three educational levels.
The most striking result is that for the high school group, the ac-
tual fractions of people in the three lowest-paying occupations
are considerably greater than the expected fractions. In the
some-college group, the same pattern is found, though less pro-
nounced numerically, and for the undergraduate-degree hold-
ers, the actual and expected distributions are essentially the
same in the lowest-paying occupations.
In general, then, under the assumptions of free entry and in-
come maximization, very few people at any education level
included in our sample would choose the blue-collar, white-
collar, or service occupations. In practice, however, a substan-
tial fraction (39 percent) of high school graduates, a smaller frac-
tion (17 percent) of the some-college group, and only 4 percent
of the B.A. holders enter these occupations. Since the discrep-
ancy between the expected and actual distributions is directly
related to education, we conclude tentatively that education it-
self is being used as a screening device to prevent those with
low educational attainment from entering the high-paying oc-
cupations.
We find a pattern of differences between expected and actual
'6The reason for including this residual is that it represents "individual effects"
(that persist over time) which, if omitted, would invalidate the assumption that
errors are independent across occupations.
'7These means differ slightly from those in Table 4-2, since in these we exclude
individuals who in 1969 did not report the educational achievement of their fa-
thers. The standard deviations are calculated afterremovingthe effects of all
variables included in our equations.r



































TABLE 9-1 Expected and actual distrIbutions of individuals, by education and occupation, 1969
'1
Actual Expected Mean
Number of per- percent- Cc!. (3) — income
people centage age col. (2) per month o income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High school
Professional 11 1,5 9.5 8.0 $960 $ 274
Technical 85 11.5 21.0 9.5 1,220 577
Sales 56 7.6 22.0 14.4 1,120 548
Blue-collar 211 28.6 1.3 —26.3 844 165
Service 50 6.8 1,4 —5.4 824 177
White-collar 24 3.3 .5 —2.8 754 127
Managerial 299 40.6 42.4 1.8 1,485 907
Some college
Professional 49 5.8 14.8 9.0 1,260 501
Technical 82 9.6 19.1 9.5 1.285 579
Sales 80 9.4 21.8 12.4 1,300 614
Blue-collar 87 10.2 .8 —9.4 882 182
Service 32 3.8 1.2 —2.6 840 228
White-collar 21 2.5 .6 —1.9 785 194
Managerial 501 58.8 39.8 —19.0 1,680 884
B.A.
Professional 257 25.0 17.8 —7.2 1.412 674
Technical 29 2.8 14.1 11.3 1,370 458
Sales 90 8.8 25.5 16.7 1,490 865
Blue-collar 18 1.8 .9 — .9 950 244
Service 11 1.1 .9 — .2 920 244
White-collar 11 1.1 .4 — .7 840 212
Managerial 610 59.4 38.3 —21.1 1.850 911
fractions within the high-paying occupations that is not as
readily explainable. The expected always exceeds the actual per-
centage by about 10 to 15 percent in the technical and sales oc-
cupations, while in the professional occupation the expected
percentage is too high in all but the B.A. group. In the manage-
rial occupation the expected percentage falls short of the actual
by a subst.intial amount except at the high school level, where
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differencesat all education levels might be explained by a com-
bination of risk- and status-related nonmonetary rewards.
A risk-averse individual may select his occupation on the
basis of the variance of income as well as the mean. Column 6 of
Table 9-1 presents the (conditional) standard error of earnings
for each occupation and education level, which we interpret as a
measure of risk.'8 Since the standard errors in column 6 are
positively correlated with mean earnings in column 5, our es-
timates of the expected fractions for the low-paying occupations
may be too small for any particular education level. But unless
high school graduates are more averse to risk, this does not
explain the differences between actual and expected fractions
that prevail across education levels, since occupational standard
errors do not differ much by education. If there are differences
in risk preference, then our previous estimates of the rate of re-
turn to education would be biased upward, because an income-
determining characteristic correlated with education would not
have been held constant.'9
The differences in column 4 could also arise because of non-
pecuniary rewards that vary by occupation. We would expect
status, one form of nonmonetary return, to be highest for the
managerial group, in which case our method will underes-
timate the fraction of people expected in the managerial cate-
gory. Since the actual does exceed the expected percentage by
about 20 percentage points at the some-college and bachelor's-
degree levels, the extremely small difference at the high school
level can be interpreted as limitations imposed by screening.
Further, a much higher percentage (43 percent) of the people in
the owner-manager group were owners at the high school level
than at other education levels. Owners cannot be screened out
of working for themselves if they can raise financial capital,
which was available to those in our sample through the Veter-
ans Administration.
The status and risk arguments may help to explain some of
the actual occupational choices, but they do not necessarily
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"The standard error is not the only possible measure of risk. For a discussion see
Tobin (1958).
"This assumes that education does not make people more willing to bear risk.r
Higher education and earnings166
Thereare, however, some other possible objections to the test at t
for screening that must be considered. Pop
First, for the conclusion on screening to be meaningful, those tima
with little education must be capable of working in the high- reas
paying occupations. Clearly, some people with just a high
sen
school education are so capable, since over 60 percent of the ro
high school group are employed in the managerial, technical, mor
sales, or professional groups (although very few are in the last pect
named).2° ner
Second, the differences between expected and actual distri- no r
butions reflect any existing entry restrictions or immobilities sam
and any deviations from the principle of income maximization be c
in addition to the type of screening mentioned above. But Fi
unless there are reasons to suppose that such factors are that
correlated with education, they cannot explain or justify the the
findings in Table 9-1. tach
Third, the earnings data used in the calculations are for mdi- othe
viduals whose average age is 47 years. To the extent that life- and
time earnings follow widely diverse patterns in different oc-
cupations at different education levels, the use of income from pect
only one year may be an inappropriate indicatorof lifetime int
earnings. However, the relative positions of occupations in
WOU
terms of mean income and variance are fairly constant from tary
coil 1955 to 1969, and as shown below, we also find evidence of
screening in 1955. Furthermore, screening is hypothesized to cies
take place when individuals first enter the job market, whereas CUP
the expected distributions calculated above refer to individuals
at the average age of 47. Now, it might be argued that even if tion
there were no initial job screening, many people might enter
the white-collar, blue-collar, and service occupations at first
simply because they involve well-defined, straightforward jobs
11 and then move into other occupations such as sales and mana-
gerial in later years. However, it is hard to believe that such vol- Ill.
untary occupational switches into preferred jobs do not occur
vt
by the age of 47.
Fourth, suppose that the blue-collar, white-collar, and service
occupations were substantially overrepresented in our sample mon
turn
200f course, the high school graduates employed in the lower-paying occupations
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at the high school level. Then the actual distributions in the
population in these occupations could approximate our es-
timates even if no screening were practiced. There are two
reasons for believing that nonrepresentativenessis not a
serious problem. First, if the actual sample distribution differs
from that of the population because the sample Consists of
more able (or otherwise better-endowed) people, then the ex-
pected sample distribution will differ in a corresponding man-
ner from the expected population distribution. Second, there is
no reason to suspect that the low-paying occupations are over-
sampled at the high school level, a condition that is required to
be consistent with our observed results.
Fifth, there may be nonmonetary rewards other than status
that differ by occupation. Suppose, for example, that those in
the blue-collar, white-collar, and service occupations prefer (at-
tach a value to) working in these jobs as compared with any
others and choose their occupation on the basis of the monetary
and nonmonetary returns. Because we have ignored the non-
monetary aspects in the calculations given above,2' these ex-
pected distributions will underestimate the number of people
in the blue-collar, white-collar, and service occupations. It
would appear, then, that by assigning the appropriate mone-
tary value to the privilege of working in the blue-collar, white-
collar, and service occupations, we can explain the discrepan-
cies between the actual and expected distributions in these oc-
cupations without relying, at all on the screening hypothesis.
There are, however, a number of problems with this explana-
tion. If we assign to alT education levels the same nonpecuniary
reward that allows us to explain the actual distribution of peo-
ple at the high school level, we will overestimate the expected
number of people in the low-paying occupations at the some-
college and B.A. levels. Second, this argument ignores the possi-
bility that those in the high-paying occupations may them-
selves be receiving a nonmonetary reward due to better work-
ing conditions or status differences.
Màreover, it should be recognized that if nonmonetary re-
turns differ by occupation, it must also be argued that the
monetary returns to education used in calculating rates of re-
turn overstate the total rate of return to education because the
21Except for pre-college teachers.
Ir
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high school category contains the largest proportion of people ted
in the low-paying occupations. forn
The final, and most important, qualification to the test for witi
screening is that the calculations are based on the assumption can
that there are no unmeasured occupation-specific skills. Since dee
we can only observe an individual in one occupation, we a b
calculate his expected earnings in other occupations from the
mean and variance of people with the same set of measured wot
characteristics, for example, education, ability, and age. Unfor- lev€.
tunately, these measured characteristics explain only a small abil
portion of the variance in earnings in the various occupations. mai
Some of the unexplained variance undoubtedly occurs because gra
of luck or other temporary factors, but the rest occurs because pec
some types of skills, talents, and abilities have not been flOL
measured.For simplicity, ifall these unmeasured skills are anc
represented bya single variable X, then in the implementation wh
of the test for screening we are assuming that the mean and gra
variance of X are the same in each occupation.
If X is more important for performance in one occupation pat
than in others, we would expect both the effect of X on earnings om
to be higher in this occupation and more people with high X
values to choose employment in this occupation. But unless X is cor
correlated with education, we will underestimate or overes- lat(
timate the potential earnings in the various occupations equally sar
at each education level and will obtain an equal "misallocation" hyl
of people at all education levels. (We would not call such a
misallocation evidence of screening.) Suppose, however, that tiO
both X and education are highly rewarded in a particular oc- for
cupation; then the average error that arises from using the mean tiv
earnings of people in an occupation to estimate the potential
earnings there of people in other occupations will be correlated
with education. For example, suppose that high school gradu-
22Th ates who are managers have compensated for their lack of edu- by.
cationby being innately more able (in a broad sense not 23Tw
measured here) than other high school graduates and college yea
graduates who are managers. Then, as long as this ability is an diff
important and recompensed characteristic of a manager, we
would assign in our calculations too high an earnings figure to dis
high school graduates who were not managers and would abi
improperly conclude that screening existed.
We have no way of determining the importance of the omit- vat2tIon and earnings168 Education as a screening device169
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ted variables, nor do we know of any studies that would be in-
formative. Nevertheless, if the calculations had been performed
with census data, mental ability would have been an obvious
candidate for the omitted (occupation-specific) variable. In-
deed, in our equations we do find that mathematical ability has
a bigger effect on earnings than do other variables in the
higher-paying occupations. The omitted-variable argument
would lead us to expect the fraction of people at each education
level in the managerial occupation to be larger the higher the
ability level, and to expect high school graduates who were
managers to be more able on the average than other high school
graduates. Analysis of our sample indicates that both these ex-
pectations are borne out, but that the effects are not pro-
nounced. For example, the mean ability level of managers is .47
and .62 for high school and college graduates, respectively,
while the corresponding means for all high school and college
graduates are .43 and .60.22Consequently,to the extent that the
omission of other occupation-specific skills follows the same
pattern as that of mental ability, the problems caused by their
omission may not be serious.
We consider very briefly now the results for 1955. Table 9-2
contains the expected and actual distributions for 1955, calcu-
lated in the same manner as were those for 1969.23 Subject to the
same qualifications, these results tend to support the screening
hypothesis. The differences between the actual and expected
percentages in the blue-collar, white-collar, and service occupa-
tions combined are about 40 percent, 12 percent, and 0 percent
for the high school, some-college, and B.A. categories, respec-
tively. Thus, as in 1969, people are apparently being screened
z?Those in the top fifth receive a score of .9, and each successive fifth declines
by .2.
'3Two general points should be made concerning the comparability of the two
years. First, as mentioned in Chapter 8, the occupational classifications may
differ slightly because the 1955 categories were determined by aggregating each
individual's description of his job into broad groups, whereas in 1969 each in-
dividual selected the broad occupation that included his job. In particular, the
distinction between the technical and professional groups may differ consider-
ably between samples. Second, the number of individuals in a particular educa-
tional group will differ in 1955 and 1969, since about 7 percent of the sample at-
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TABLE 9-2Expected and actual distributions ol by education and occupation, 1955
Actual Expected Mean
Number of per- percent- Col. (3) — income
people centage age col. (2) per month o income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1-ugh school
Professional 77 9.9 5.1 —4.8 $580 $203
Technical 24 3.1 3.2 .1 469 114
Sates 72 9.2 8.9 — .3 576 191
Blue-collar 293 37.6 5,1 —32.5 439 102
Service 28 3.6 5.0 1.4 418 103
White-collar 91 11.7 1.8 —9.9 382 83
Managerial 195 25.0 87.5 42.5 625 282
Some college
Professional 156 17.9 3.2 —14.7 603 172
Technical 45 5.2 3.5 —1.7 491 134
Sales 124 14.2 19.6 5.4 629 434
Blue-collar 135 15.5 5.1 —10.4 467 146
Service 18 2.1 5.6 3,5 457 167
White-collar 61 7.0 1.3 —5.7 398 74
Managerial 334 38.3 58.4 20.1 654 279
BA.
Professional 488 43.9 3.8 —40.1 576 171
Technical 20 1.8 3.7 1.9 438 124
Sales 139 12.5 10.5 —2.0 597 219
Blue-collar 44 4.0 4,3 —.3 479 113
Service 14 1.3 4.3 3.0 479 118
White-collar 45 4.0 1.4 — 2.6 412 85



















out of the high-paying occupations at the low education levels,
but not at the high ones.
The major difference between the two years is that in 1955 the
expected number of owner-managers substantially exceeds the
actual number at all three education levels; in 1969 the reverse is
true except at the high school level (where the expected equals
the actual). One possible explanation for the 1955 results is that
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whoin their early years are in the professional, technical, and
sales occupations.
We can use these estimates of expected distributions to deter-
mine what income differentials attributable to education would
have been in the absence of screening. Such returns are of inter-
est because they represent the extent to which those presented
earlier reflect increases in productivity, rather than "discrimi-
nation" in the job market. To calculate returns to education, we
weight the earnings differences due to education in various oc-
cupations by the expected distribution of people across occupa-
tions. These returns are upper bounds to those that would actu-
ally occur because they do not allow for income levels to adjust
as the occupational distributions change.24
In Table 9-3 we present the percentages by which earnings in
the some-college and B.A. categories exceed high school earn-
ings for the actual and expected distributions for 1955 and. 1969.
In 1955, the earnings differentials due to education under the
assumption of no entry barriers are only about one-half to one-
third as large as the actual ones. In 1969, the expected differen-
tials are about one-half as large as the actual ones. This suggests
that screening accounts for a substantial portion of educational
earnings differentials. The implications of this for rates of re-
turn to education are discussed below.
TABLE 9-3 weducation levels, Earnings
differentials
attributable to
is that in 1955 the education,for
actual and Lntiallyexceeds the expected
1969 the reverse is occupational
distributions,
heexpected equals 1955and 1969(as
apercentage of 1955results is that highschool





1955 1969 1955 1969
Some college 15,2 24.3 5.0 12.5














































24These are unadjusted estimates in that they do not allow for differences in abili.
ty, background, age, and so on. Because they are compared with estimates ob-
tained by weighting the same earnings figures by the actual distributions, how-
ever, the percentage differences between these two sets of estimates will proba-
bly be reasonable approximations to the adjusted income differentials.Higher education and earnings172
SCREENINGTheprivate rate of return to education is higher when screening bush
OF RETURN exists than it would be under conditions of free entry into all it red
EDUCATIONjobs.This follows directly from the finding just given that ex- tribu
pected income differentials are about one-half to one-third as fect
large as the actual ones, and from the fact that the private costs
of education are not likely to change much as a result of screen- redu
ing.25 Moreover, if firms respond to increases in the supply of were
educated people by raising the screening level, wages in the socia
high-paying occupations need not adjust. This might explain woul
why the private rate of return to college did not change much tion.
from 1939 through 1969. Sii
The social rate of return to education, on the other hand, may be
or may not be higher when there is screening. The reason for prob
this is that, although educational income differentials are again als a
higher under screening, education also serves to provide firms
with information that allows them to reduce sorting costs. usin
Hence, if educational screening were not practiced, additional
costs would have to be incurred by firms and by society in of ti
order to replace this sorting function of education. Calculation Ti
of a social return to education when screening is practiced thus givi
requires that we subtract from costs an amount equal to the cost eves
of the best alternative sorting technique. Hence, the social re- that
turn may be high even if education does not substantially Firs
increase individual productivities. Since we have no evidence that
on the cost of alternative sorting techniques, we do not present reso
estimates of the social rate of return that would prevail in the had
absence of screening. We conjecture, however, that this rate is in8
substantially lower than the estimates given earlier in this otht
book, in which no attempt was made to account for screening. reso
While the purpose of this study is to determine the effect of ben
education on income and to examine the cause of this effect, we sam
feel that it is important to explore briefly the implications of A
screening for educational policy. ing
We assume that screening has two major effects—it saves cost
peo
tior
25The existence of screening will affect opportunity costs because it will increase ing
the number of individuals in the low-paying occupations, thus depressing
average earnings of those at low education levels. Hence, when there are only 0
two levels of education, screening will reduce the average earnings of those tow
with low education, but when different levels of education are used as a screen
for different jobs, it is not clear whether wages of high school graduates will
increase or decrease as a result of screening.
i:ation and earnings172 1 Educationas a screening device173
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businesses and society some of the costs of sorting people, and
it redistributes income. If society is not in favor of such a redis-
tribution, it can use its tax and transfer schemes to undo the ef-
fect of screening on the income distribution. Under this
scheme, the private individual return to education would be
reduced until it equaled the return that would exist if there
were no screening. To the extent that individual demand and
social supply of education are based on the rate of return, this
would reduce the number of people obtaining higher educa-
tion.
Since determining the exact taxes and transfers to use would
be difficult, other approaches should be considered. The
problem of redistribution arises when some qualified individu-
als are not allowed into occupations because of their education
level, a practice that is followed because firms save on costs by
using the free information on schooling to sort people. This
suggests two possibilities: eliminate the informational content
of the screen or charge businesses for the information.
The informational content could be eliminated either by not
giving firms access to a person's education level or by giving
everyone the same education. The problem with the former is
that it is unrealistic. There are several objections to the latter.
First, if the education were to be similar in nature and quality to
that currently given, it would be a very expensive use of
resources to achieve the stated purpose. Second, if everyone
had the same education, firms either would base their screen-
ing on the quality of the education or would have to spend
other resources in obtaining information. In either case the
resources spent on education would only garner the skill
benefits. Finally, it is likely that not everyone would want the
same level of education or have the capacity to achieve it.
Alternatively, businesses could be taxed annually for employ-
ing educated people. They would then have to weigh these
costs against the extra sorting costs in finding the appropriate
people among the less educated. We would expect some addi-
tional hirings among the less educated as well as a partial shar-
ing of this tax (through a reduction in income) by the educated.
Both these shifts would tend to reduce the return on education
toward the one implied by perfect competition.
As noted above, one effect of screening is to reduce sorting
costs for individual firms. However, society as a whole pays forr
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thesecosts by devoting resources to higher education, whereas
if there were no screening, alternative sorting policies would
have to be developed by firms. Presumably, employers, looking
for specific employee characteristics in different occupations,
would develop tests to provide information on these character.
istics. Alternatively, the testing would not necessarily have to
be developed and administered by individual firms, but could
be done by one or a few centralized agencies or even by the
government itself. This type of sorting procedure would proba-
bly be cheaper in terms of resource cost than using the educa-
tional system.
Finally, society could consider the redistributive return as In this
equivalent to a monopoly return on a product that it supplied, of the
Under this interpretation, the government could capture the only ii
excess return by substantially raising the tuition components of area,
the investment cost. Such a scheme could be accompanied by
an educational-loan plan, so that educational opportunity cation
would be made available to all, and those who achieved an edu- quant
cation would not receive an excess return due to entry restric- meast
tions into certain occupations. days,
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